Abstract
Introduction
Privacy protection has become a critical issue in the applications of database [1, 2] . So when we publish data, we should make a technical response to the demand for simultaneous privacy protection and information sharing. The work on k-anonymity [3, 4] addresses the problem of reducing the risk of identifying individuals in a person-specific table. Typically, a set of identifying attributes in a table, called the quasi-identifier or QID, is generalized to a less precise representation so that each partition grouped by QID contains at least k records. Hence, if some record is linked to an external source by a QID value, so are at least k-1 other records having the same QID value, making it difficult to distinguish a particular individual. All tuples with the same QID value form an equivalence class(QID-EC for short).A QID-EC is said to be l-diversity if the proportion of each sensitive value is at most 1/ l. A table satisfies l-diversity if all QID-EC in it are l-diverse. Do these models really preserve "privacy"? As explained below, in this paper we will show that the answer to this question is interestingly no.
We know that the previous studies only consider an adversary has some of basic background knowledge, such as the adversary knows that Japanese have an extremely low incidence of heart disease or a voter registration list and so on. Usually we call the attack with some basic background knowledge as background knowledge attack. However, in fact, some adversaries have ability to study anonymous algorithm, and can initiate an advanced attack. For example, the advanced attack mainly points that the attacker can possibly determine the privacy requirement (e.g., 2-anonymity or 5-diversity), the anonymous operations to achieve the privacy requirement, and the detailed mechanism of an anonymous algorithm. That is, the attacker can possibly determine the privacy requirement and anonymous operations by examining the published data, or its documentation, and learn the mechanism of the anonymous algorithm by, for example, reading research papers.
However, how does an adversary discover the individual privacy when s/he obtains critical factor from anonymous algorithm? We know that, in most previous works [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] , the existing anonymous approaches for data publishing follow an implicit principle: "For any anonymous mechanism, it is desirable to define some notion of minimum. That is to say, a k-anonymity should not generalize, suppress, or distort the data more than it is necessary to achieve k-anonymity." So the generalization steps minimum is the critical condition for advanced attack.
In this paper, we mainly study the case where the adversary has some additional knowledge about the mechanism involved in the anonymization, and thus can launch an attack based on this knowledge. In the following example, we will introduce the problem of advanced attacks in privacy preservation for data publishing. In summary, if a raw table T is anonymous to a masked table which satisfies l-diversity according to the minimal generalized steps. This is true for both global recoding and local recoding and advanced attack exists when the set of individuals related to external tables is related to T. So the objective studied in this paper is to generate a generalized version of table T that satisfies anonymous requirement by GSSK algorithm.
Problem Statements
Let a raw table T be a relation storing private information about a set of individuals. Consider all attributes have finite domains in table T, and we assume that each categorical attribute is accompanied by a taxonomy tree which indicates the publicly-known hierarchy among the possible values of each categorical attribute [4, 5] . Now, we clarify several fundamental concepts.
Definition 1 (Generalized Step Minimal Mechanism) Suppose Α is an anonymous algorithm for privacy requirement . Let table T* be a table generated by Α and T* satisfies privacy requirement. Then table T* should have minimum generalized steps than it is necessary to achieve privacy requirement. Note that this generalized step minimum mechanism holds for both global recoding and local recoding in Section 1.
Assumption (Adversary Professional Knowledge K includes a set of taxonomy tree of QID and whether the anonymous algorithm conforms to the taxonomy tree of QID, the target of privacy requirement and whether the anonymous algorithm follows minimum generalized steps. We refer to this knowledge as 
Privacy preservation is one side of anonymity. The other side is retaining information so that the published data remains practically useful. In this paper, we use data metric which measures the data quality in the entire anonymous table with respect to the data quality in the original table.
Definition 4 (Information Loss) Let T* is a released table generalized by a raw table T. Let DGH A be domain generalization hierarchy for attribute A. Let n q be the number of attribute of quasi-identifier attribute set. Let h be level value of generalized attribute value in value generalization hierarchy where h:0,…n. Let |T| be the number of tuples of table T. The information loss metric of generalization of table T is given by:
If each value is in the ground value so each h=0; therefore IL(T)=0. Conversely, in the case where each value in raw table T is the maximal level of its hierarchy, each h=|DHG A |; and so IL(T)=1.
Inference Analysis of the Privacy disclosure
In this section, we describe the inference process of advanced attack by global recoding and local recoding respectively. Advanced attack sometimes is successful if the adversary can compute the derivation values and find a violation of m-threshold when the privacy requirement is l-diversity, however, sometimes it is not. The computation depends on a combinatorial analysis on the possibilities given the knowledge of b ad K and p ad K . In particular, the adversary attacks by excluding some possible scenarios, tilting the probabilistic balance towards privacy disclosure.
Analysis of Global Recoding
Under the scheme of global recoding [7] , all values of an attribute come from the same domain level in the hierarchy. That is, all values come from the values in the same level in the generalization hierarchy. Advanced attack is successful when we use similar method in the literature [11] .
The derivation of probability is better illustrated with the example as shown in Table 4 (b) which is global recoding of Table 4 (a) to achieve 2-diversity. In Table 4 (b), "Cancer" is the only sensitive value set and the goal is 2-diversity. Assume that raw table T and external table have matching cardinality on QID. From external table, the adversary can determine that there are two tuples in b1, eight tuples in b2 and two tuples in b3. Since there are 8 tuples with a QID value of b2, and there are in total 4 sensitive tuples, b2 trivially satisfies 2-diversity. As T* (Table 4 (a)) is generalized, the adversary decides that QID-EC's b1 must contains one or two sensitive tuples. With this in mind, the adversary lists all the possible combinations of the number of sensitive tuples among the three classes b1, b2 and b3 in which either b1 or b3 or both contain 2 sensitive tuples as shown in Table 5 K is equal to 52/236=0.22. In the following, we use p(C) to denote the probability of event C occurs. Thus, the probability ( | ) 
Analysis of Local Recoding
An example is shown in Table 7 (a) to illustrate the derivation of the attack with local recoding for l-diversity. For the QID, assume that only b1 and b2 can be generalized to b. Assume that Table 7 (a) and the external table have the same cardinality on QID. The proportion of the sensitive records in the set of records with b1 is equal to 3 / 5 which is larger than1 / 2 . Thus, the set of records with b1 does not satisfy 2-diversity. K , from the external table, there are five records with b1 and four records with b2. These are the only records with QID that can be generalized to b. The attacker reasons: there are four sensitive records in a generalized table. Suppose they all appear in the records containing b2, b2 still satisfy 2-diversity. The generalized table must be caused by the set of records in b1. In the QID-EC for b contains one sensitive record and one non-sensitive record. The sensitive record should come from b1 because if this sensitive record does not come from b1, there will have been no need for the generalization. Consider the probability that an individual ε with b1 is linked to Cancer given b ad K and p ad K .There exist two cases, too. In the first case, the record of an individual ε appears in the QID-EC of b1 in Table 7 (b). There are four records with value b1 in Table 7 (b). For external table, there are five records with b1. The probability that Case1 occurs is 4/5, that is, p(case1)=0.8. In the second case, the record of an individual ε appears in the QID-EC of b1 in Table 7 (b). There are four records with value b1 in Table  7 (b). For external table, there are totally five records with b1. So one such record must have been generalized and is now in the QID-EC of b in Table 7 (b). The probability of Case 2 is 1/5, that is,
However, 2 out of 4 tuples in the QID-EC of b1 in Table 5 (b) contain "Cancer", and the "Cancer" tuple in the QID-EC of b in Table 7 (b) must be from b1. Thus, 
, which is greater than 0.5. Thus, the anonymized table violates 2-threshold.
Failure of advanced attack
An advanced attack is not always successful even when there are some excluded combination in the sensitive tuple distribution table based on b ad K and p ad K . Following is a converse example. The derivation of probability is better illustrated with the example as shown in Table 1 (c) which is global recoding of Table 1(b) to achieve 2-diversity. In Table 1 (b), "Cancer" is the only sensitive value set and the goal is 2-diversity. Assume that raw table T and external table have matching cardinality on QID. From external table, the adversary can determine that there are two tuples in b1, five tuples in b2. Since there are 5 tuples with a QID value of b2, and there are in total 2 sensitive tuples, b2 trivially satisfies 2-diversity. As T* (Table 1(c) ) is generalized, the adversary decides that QID-EC's b1 must contains two sensitive tuples. With this in mind, the adversary lists all the possible combinations of the number of sensitive tuples among the two classes b1 and b2 in which either b1 or b2 or both contain 2 sensitive tuples as shown in Table 6 . There are only three possible combinations as shown.
In scenario (a), there are K is equal to 10 / 21 . In the second case, there is two sensitive tuples in b1. The total number of cases where there is two sensitive tuples in b1 is equal to 2. The probability that Case 2 occurs given 
The Proposed Algorithm
In most data anonymous methods, if generalization steps do not reach the privacy goal, further generalization can be made. However, further generalizations can not guard an individual privacy. How to determine k-anonymity table has still been required for further generalized, and is also the focus of discussion in this section.
Here, we proposed a feasible solution for m-threshold in section 2. Our algorithm based on k-anonymity has been improved, that is, according to m-threshold, we determine whether there exists further induction of the QID-EC of anonymous table. Algorithm is referred to as GSSK (Generalization Step Safe of K-anonymity).
GSSK algorithm includes the following steps. 1. Construct an k-anonymity table T* from the given raw table(which will be described in Algorithm 1), and assign each QID-EC in the resulting table a group ID.
2. Find each group ID whose QID-EC does not satisfy l-diversity, denotedτ . 3. For allτ , we construct some counterfeit tuples [12] in order to eachτ satisfies l-diversity, and make an auxiliary table save those counterfeit tuples. For eachτ , the number of counterfeit tuples is the number when onceτ satisfies l-diversity and at the same time generalization will stop.
The bottom-up breadth first search has been found to be highly effective in k-anonymity [13] . In this approach, we first check single-attribute subsets of the QID, and then iterate, checking k-anonymity with respect to increasingly large subsets until all attributes of QID is in the subsets. The pseudo-code of the bottom-up breadth first approach is shown as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Bottom-up Breadth First Approach for Multi-attribute 1: for i=1 to the number of attribute in QID do 2: compute the root, where root is the node which is ground value in generalization hierarchy 3: Insert root into a queue 4: while queue is not empty do 5: node ← root 6: check k-anonymity with respect to attributes of node 7:
if T is k-anonymous with respect to attributes of node then 8:
Mark all direct generalizations of the node 9: else 10: discard the node 11:
insert all direction generalization of the discarded node into queue 12: endif 13: endwhile 14: Add a attribute to the previous generalization hierarchy, then construct a new generalization hierarchy tree 15: endfor 16: return a generalized table of QID which satisfies k-anonymity
Experimental Results
The proposed algorithm is evaluated by using Adults databases from the UC Irvine Machine Learning Repository. Using a configuration similar to that in [13] and nine of the attributes, all of which were considered as part of the quasi-identifier, and eliminating records with unknown values. The resulting table contained 45,222 records.
The experimental databases are described in table 8, which lists the number of unique values for each attributes, and gives a brief description of the associated generalizations. In some cases, these were based on a categorical taxonomy tree, and in other cases they were based on rounding numeric values or simple suppression. The height of each domain generalization hierarchy is listed in parentheses. We implemented the value generalizations by algorithm 1 with C++.
Analysis of advanced attack
It is interested to know how successful the advanced attack can be in a real data set with existing minimal generalization steps based anonymous algorithm. Set k=l, where the configuration is similar to [10] . By computing the Breach Probability values in the Section 2, it is found that the advanced attack successfully uncovered QID-EC's which violates m-threshold, where m=l. Let us call the tuples in such QID-EC's the suspicious tuples. Fig.1(a) shows the percentage of suspicious tuples among all sensitive tuples under the variation of m, where the total number of sensitive tuples is 1,568. The general trend is that the percentage increases when m increases. When m increases, there is higher chance that suspicious tuples are generalized with more generalized tuples. Also, it is more likely that those generalized tuples are easily uncovered for the advanced attack..
In Fig.1(b) , when m increases, it is obvious that the average Breach Probability of suspicious tuples decreases. When m increases, 1/m decreases. Thus, each QID-EC contains at most 1/m occurrences of the sensitive value set. Thus, this lowers the Breach Probability of the tuples in QID-ECs.
It is shown in Fig.1(c) that the percentage of suspicious tuples increases with QID size. The reason is that the size of each QID-EC is smaller with the larger QID size. It is more likely that a QID-EC violates the privacy requirement. Thus, more tuples are vulnerable for the advanced attack. Fig.1(d) shows that the average Breach Probability of suspicious tuples remain nearly unchanged when the QID size increases because the Breach Probability is based on m. It is noted that the average credibility in Fig.1(d) is about 0.923, which is greater than 0.5.
In our experiment, we focus on the average number of counterfeits when we vary m from 2 to 10. The average number never exceeds 2.34. Fig.2 shows that it is possible way to insert counterfeit tuples into QID-EC when QID-EC does not satisfy m-threshold.
Moreover, we also consider the default QID size = 8. When m = 2, the execution time of the computation of the credibility of each QID-EC's in the original table is about 163s. When m = 10, the execution time is 225s. It is not costly for an adversary to launch an advanced attack.
Analysis of the proposed algorithm
The proposed algorithm is compared with a local recoding algorithm for (α, k)-anonymity [9] . Let us refer to our proposed algorithm as GSSK, which is described in Section 4 and does not guarantee m-threshold, but it is suitable for comparison since it considers both k-anonymity and l-diversity, where l=m. It is therefore interested to know the overhead required in the proposed approach in order to achieve m-threshold. When we compared GSSK with (α, k)-anonymity, set α= 1/m and k=8. We evaluated the algorithms in terms of two measurements: information loss of QID attributes and distortion of sensitive attribute. The distortion of sensitive attribute is calculated by the information loss formula in Definition 4. A different name is given for the ease of reference. By default, the weighting of each attribute used in the evaluation of information loss is equal to 1/|QID|, where |QID| is the QID size. For each measurement, the experiments are conducted 56 times and took the average. We have implemented one generalized table of GSSK algorithm. We may generalize the QID attributes of the data and distort the sensitive attribute of the data. Thus, we measured these by information loss and distortion, respectively.
In Fig.3 , it can be found that sometimes information loss rate of (α, k)-anonymity is higher than GSSK, since (α, k)-Anonymity algorithm has to fend off advanced attack while the GSSK does not. However, GSSK algorithm considers only the first step of the k-anonymity and does not consider sensitive attribute of equivalence class satisfy l-diversity. So leading to (α, k)-anonymity does more generalization steps in the algorithm while the GSSK does not. But the general trend of information loss rate of (α, k)-anonymity is lower than that of GSSK because of inserting counterfeit tuples, in order to satisfy the m-threshold ,the GSSK algorithm do more generalization, while (α, k)-anonymous algorithm has no such operation. However, from the overall shape of curves, there is more larger of quasi-identifier attribute set, GSSK algorithm is demonstrated with less information loss rates than the (α, k)-anonymity algorithm. In Fig.4 , the distortion of the two algorithms increase with the QID size. since the number of QID-EC's increases and the average size of each QID-EC decreases. For the GSSK algorithm, the probability that a QID-EC violates l-diversity (after the k-anonymity step) will be higher. Thus there is a higher chance for the distortion. 
Conclusion
In the existing privacy protection approaches for data publishing, in order to prevent information loss with the minimum, a minimum generalization steps is an underlying principle. In this paper, we show sometimes the published data on basis of the method could still be attacked when an attacker can possibly determine the privacy requirement and anonymous operations by examining the published data, or its documentation, and learn the mechanism of the anonymous algorithm. We call this an advanced attack. We build the m-threshold model which deals with the advanced attack and a solution for this problem. For future work we are interested in determining the advanced attack related to continuous data publishing.
